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IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS FOR NONPAY-
MENT OF FINES
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or
property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor
adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial
recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober
criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of
our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the
equality of our civilization may be judged.'
The use of fines as a criminal sanction has been a part of Anglo-Ameri-
can law for over six hundred years.2 From the inception of this penalty,
however, law making bodies have had to deal with the convicted criminal
who fails or refuses to pay the fine imposed upon him. The early non-paying
offender faced being sold into slavery' unless the necessary funds could be
produced by family or friends. From such early remedies for default our
present more civilized alternative of imprisonment arose.
Today almost every state,4 including Virginia,5 has statutory provisions
for the imprisonment of defendants who fail to pay their fines.6 The inherent
constitutionality of these sanctions has never been questioned as a valid
method of enforcing the payment of fines. Such statutes have almost uni-
versally been upheld as constitutional on their face, but considerable con-
troversy has arisen as to the validity of their application to indigent7 defen-
dants as a class.'
1 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
22 F. PO.oc & F. MArTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 451-462, 517-518 (2d ed.
1968).3 See Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E.2d 749 (1969); 2 F. PoL.ocK &
F. MAI LANp, THE HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 517 (2d ed. 1968).
4 For a catalogue of current state statutes providing for incarceration for the failure
to pay a fine, see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
See VA. CoDE ANN § 19.1-338, -339 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
The Supreme Court has consistently implied its approval of the use of imprisonment
as a legitimate method for the collection of fines. See Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L.W. 4301
(U.S. March 2, 1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Hill v. United States
ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). See
generally Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968); Sawyer v. District
of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1964).
t There seems to be no uniform method which courts may use to determine which
defendants are indigent. This determination is generally left to the judge's discretion
upon hearing a general report on the defendant's financial condition, although some
statutes provide specific guidelines for this decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3569 (Supp. V,
1969).
8 Conpare Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968); United States ex
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Default statutes have been attacked by indigent offenders on several
constitutional grounds, including the excessive fines' and cruel and unusual
punishment"0 provisions of the eighth amendment and the involuntary servi-
tude provision of the thirteenth amendment. 1 The most successful attacks,
however, have been made under the due process and equal protection clauses
rel. Privitera v. IXross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965); State v. Brown, 5 Conn. Cir. 228, 249 A.2d 672
(1967); Adjmi v. State, 139 So.2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People ex rel. Jackson
v. Ruddell, 42 ll.2d 40, 245 N.E.2d 761 (1969); Wade v. Carsley, 221 So. 2d 725
(Miss. 1969); State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969); People ex rel.
Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1965); People v. Watson,
204 Misc. 467, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1953); with Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970), vacating sub nom. People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d 511, 244 N.E.2d
197 (1969); Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated per curiam,
399 U.S. 508 (1970); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970);
Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Hampton,
209 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1968); Spinler v. State, 152 Mont. 69, 446 P.2d 429 (1968);
State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969) (dissenting opinion); People v.
McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Orange County Ct. 1967); People v.
Tennyson, 19 N.Y.2d 273, 281 N.Y.S.2d 76, 277 NE.2d 876 (1967); People v. Saffore,
18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686 (1966); People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d
210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange County Ct. 1965); Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95,
253 N.E.2d 749 (1969); Petition of Cole, 17 Ohio App. 2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968).
See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 18 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT];
Goldberg, Equality and Govermnental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 205 (1964).
9 See, e.g., Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated per curiam,
399 U.S. 508 (1970); Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968); United
States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 230 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965); Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d
314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969);
People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686 (1966).
'
0 See, e.g., Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated per
curianz, 399 U.S. 508 (1970); Nemeth v. Thomas, 35 U.S.L.W. 2320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 5, 1966); People ex rel. Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453
(1965); Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.V. 175 (1925). See generally Note,
The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of
Fines, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938 (1966); Note, Imprisomnent of an Indigent for the
Nonpayment of a Fine Violates the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishmnents and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 4
HOUSTON L. REv. 695 (1967).
"See, e.g., Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated per
curiam, 399 U.S. 508 (1970). Imprisonment for nonpayment of court costs has also
been attacked under the involuntary servitude provision. See Wright v. Matthews,
209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968). In Wright, the petitioner, being indigent, also
attacked the constitutionality of his imprisonment under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, but the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals declined to rule on these issues.
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of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Arguments under the latter provisions are
generally based on the failure of these statutes to fulfill their legislative pur-
poses when applied to indigent defendants. 3
Default statutes are generally said to have a dual purpose, depending
on the situation: (1) they serve as a means of coercion, and (2) they act
as an alternative punishment.' 4 The theory behind such statutes is that the
defendant is given a choice when sentenced to pay a fine: he may either
pay the fine and go free, or he may refuse to pay the fine and "work it off"
by serving a corresponding number of days in jail.' His decision will be
based on his personal sense of values. If he feels that his liberty is more
valuable to him than the dollar value of the fine, he will choose to pay it.
If, on the other hand, he feels that his liberty is not worth that amount
of money, he may go to jail. 6 Either way, the legislative purposes of the
statute are fulfilled. The spectre of imminent imprisonment will have the
effect of encouraging the convicted defendant to pay his fine; but if he
refuses, he will then be faced with the alternative term of imprisonment.
12See cases cited note 6 supra. Although many courts have used the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as a basis for ruling on imprisonment of indigent
defendants who default in the payment of fines, the majority of courts have relied on
the equal protection provision. Equal protection reasoning is more easily applied to
the situation in which a class of individuals are discriminated against on the basis of
wealth. See Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HAv. L. Rlv. 435 (1967); 84 HAnv. L. Rav. 46 (1970). The most
far-reaching case yet to be decided in this area is In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d
999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970). In that case the California Supreme Court held that
the imprisonment of an indigent defendant for his inability to pay a fine which was an
alternative of a jail sentence was a denial of equal protection. The court felt that
the imprisonment of indigent defendants in this manner was unreasonably discriminatory
since incarceration was not constitutionally "necessary" for the collection of fines.
13 See, e.g., Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated per curiarn,
399 U.S. 508 (1970); Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E. 2d 749 (1969).
'4Id.
:r The rate of credit at which the offender may work off his fine varies from state
to state. Some states allow no more than $1 or less credit per day of imprisonment.
See, e.g., Aiuz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2315 (1964);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 127, § 144 (1969); VA. CoDE ANN. § 53-221 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
Other states credit defendants with as much as $10 per day. See MD. ANN. COna art. 38,
§ 4 (Cum. Supp. 1970); MoNT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 95-3202(b) (1969).
10The defendant is faced with the same choice whether he is sentenced to a jail
term plus a fine ("$30 and 30 days"), a jail term or a fine ("$30 or 30 days"), or merely
a flat fine without a jail term. In the first and third situations, an alternate jail
sentence will be prescribed by statute if the defendant defaults in payment. In the
"$30 or 30 days" situation, the trial judge imposes the term of imprisonment in the
case of default. The result as far as the defendant is concerned is the same.
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The failure of this legislative theory occurs, however, when the defen-
dant is indigent and therefore unable to pay his fine." In this situation
neither statutory purpose is fulfilled. If a fine is imposed upon an indigent
defendant, the threat of imprisonment, no matter how severe, could never
succeed in forcing him to pay. Since the statute fails as a means of coercion,
its role must then be to serve as an alternative punishment. When this situa-
tion is applied to indigent offenders, it is obvious that this alternative is an
involuntary one and, in most cases, an unreasonable one." The defendant
of means has an actual choice of paying the fine or serving the jail term,
but the choice of the indigent defendant is really an illusory one. Being
unable to pay the fine, he is forced to go to jail." The result of this situa-
tion is a discriminatory treatment of a certain class of offenders on the
basis of wealth.'" Such statutory classifications have generally been defended
as a necessary result of the enforcement of legitimate state interests,2' i.e.,
retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and collection of fines.
It has been held by the Supreme Court that the type of judicial treat-
ment received by an accused should not depend upon his financial condi-
tion.22 When statutory classifications are made which result in the denial
of basic rights, such as liberty, the guarantee of equal protection under the
17 See TASK FORCE REPORT 18; Goldberg, supra n.8, at 221.
18 If an indigent defendant is to be forced to accept imprisonment as an alternative
to the payment of his fine, such imprisonment must be a reasonable alternative to be
constitutionally acceptable. It could easily be argued that $1 per day credit is not
reasonable, but it would be difficult to determine what a reasonable rate of credit
would be. People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Orange County Ct.
1967) (held $1 per day credit unreasonable); Strattman v. Studr, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95,
253 N.E.2d 749 (1969) (held $3 per day credit unreasonable). Indeed, many would
argue that no dollar value can be equated to an individual's loss of liberty.
19 As stated by former Justice Goldberg, "The resulting imprisonment is no more
or no less than imprisonment for being poor, a doctrine which I trust this Nation
has long since outgrown." Goldberg, supra n.8, at 221.
20 See In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970); State v.
Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969) (dissenting opinion); TASK FoRCE
REPORT 18.
21 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp.
732 (D. Md. 1968); Wade v. Carsley, 221 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 1969). In Kelly, the court
stated the following at 737:
The commitment of convicted defendants who default in the payment of their
fines, whether from inability or unwillingness to pay, imposes a burden upon a
defined class to achieve a permissable end in which the State has a vital interest;
i.e., that persons who are found guilty of breaking the law shall receive some
appropriate punishment, to impress on the offender the importance of observing
the law, in the hope of reforming him, and to deter the offender and other
potential offenders from committing such offenses in the future.22 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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law requires that such classification be justified by some compelling state
interest." Otherwise, any such discriminatory treatment may be considered
invidious and therefore contrary to the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection provision.' The most far-reaching Supreme Court ruling in this
area is Williams v. Illinois.2" In Williams an indigent defendant was con-
victed of petty theft, a misdemeanor, and sentenced to the maximum
punishment for that offense of one year in jail, plus a $500 fine and $5
court costs. The defendant, being unable to pay his fine at the completion
of his one year term, was to be retained in custody to work off his fine and
costs at the rate of $5 of the fine for each day in jail, pursuant to an Illinois
default statute." The majority of the Court held that such treatment of an
indigent defendant amounted to an invidious discrimination and therefore
was a denial of equal protection of the law2" as guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment. The Court's decision, however, was limited to the situa-
tion in which an indigent defendant is imprisoned for a period longer than
the maximum statutory term for the substantive offense solely due to his
inability to pay a fine.2" The court hastened to point out that its decision
in no way affected the typical alternative "$30 or 30 days" situation.
The majority of the Court reasoned that once a state determines through
its legislative branch what the maximum penalty for a substantive offense
should be, the mandates of the equal protection clause prohibit increasing
2 See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 US. 305 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
241d.
25 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
26 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7 (k) (Smith-Hurd 1970). Since the defendant was
unable to pay the assessments against him, he faced an additional term of 101 days
for the $505 in fines and costs.
27 Although the other Justices joined Chief Justice Burger in his equal protection
approach to Williamns, Justice Harlan wrote a special concurring opinion in which he
reached the same holding as did the majority, but by way of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Harlan's use of the due process clause rather
than the equal protection clause is consistent with his opinions in other discrimination
cases similar to Williams. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Harper v.
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(Harlan, J, dissenting).
28 Since the maximum jail term for the crime of petty theft in Illinois was one
year, the imprisonment of Williams for an additional 101 days for his inability to pay
the fine would be unconstitutional. Presumably, if Williams had only been sentenced
to six months in jail for his offense, the additional 101 days would have been con-
stitutionally permissable.
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this penalty against a certain class of offenders solely because of their indi-
gence. Since the Illinois legislature had determined that the state's retribu-
tive interests for a misdemeanor could be fully satisfied by a maximum jail
term of one year, the court felt that the incarceration of Williams beyond
that term merely because he was unable to pay his fine amounted to in-
vidious discrimination.29
Shortly after the Williams decision, the Supreme Court applied the same
equal protection reasoning to a slightly different factual situation. In Tate
v. Short"° the defendant had been convicted of nine traffic violations in the
corporation court of Houston, Texas, and was fined a total of $425. The
offenses for which Tate was convicted were punishable by fine only. Being
unable to pay the fines, the defendant was ordered to work off his sentence
at a municipal prison farm at the rate of $5 per day.
The Supreme Court held, upon the defendant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus, that the imprisonment of Tate for his inability to pay his
fines was "precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination" as existed
in Williams, and was therefore a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Since the maximum punishment for traffic
violations in Texas is the assessment of a fine, the Court held that punish-
ment could not constitutionally be converted into a jail sentence solely
because the defendant is indigent and unable to pay his fine. The Court
recognized other feasible methods for the collection of fines (such as the
installment method) which could be utilized by the states before resorting
to imprisonment. However, the Court reserved judgment upon the situation
where an indigent defendant has made all reasonable attempts to pay his
fines by such alternative means but has been unable to effect payment.
The Tate decision should have a profound effect upon the sentencing
procedure of the lower courts of most states, including Virginia. Tate will
prohibit the automatic imprisonment of indigent defendants convicted of
offenses for which the only statutory punishment is a fine. This decision
will force all states to adopt some alternative method of collection to replace
the convenient system of automatic imprisonment for default. However, the
states may continue to use imprisonment in the case of the contumacious
29 Accord, Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968);
People v. Tennyson, 19 N.Y.2d 273, 281 N.Y.S.2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 876 (1967); People v.
Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 218 N.E.2d 686 (1966); Petition of Cole,
17 Ohio App. 2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968); cf., State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187,
249 A.2d 70 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Contra, State v. Hampton, 209 So. 2d 899
(Miss. 1968).
30 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971).
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offender as well as the offender who has attempted to satisfy his fine by
alternative methods but could not.
The Tate decision, even though it imposes an important limitation upon
lower state courts, factually does not apply to those defendants fined for
offenses punishable by fine and imprisonment. Tate, just as Williams, pre-
vents only the increasing of the statutory ceiling on imprisonment for the
substantive crime in the case of indigent offenders. It does not prevent the
default imprisonment of defendants when such imprisonment would not
exceed the maximum statutory jail term allowed for that offense.
Although the Williams decision was restricted to that situation in which
the defendant faced imprisonment beyond the maximum statutory term,
the equal protection reasoning of the Court could logically be extended
much further.8 Even though the state legislature may decide that its pen-
alogical interests regarding a certain offense may be satisfied by a giverr
term of imprisonment, it is a well-accepted doctrine that the punishment
for a specific offense should be made to fit the specific defendant on trial
and the particular circumstances surrounding his act. 2 So when a trial
court sets the term of incarceration for a misdemeanant at six months while
the maximum punishment is one year in jail, the judge is saying that the
state's penalogical interests in regard to this specific offense can be satisfied
by a jail term of only six months. A state can speak through its judicial
branch just as effectively as it can through its legislature. The judicial body
may even be more effective since the trial judge has the facts and circum-
stances of each case there before him.
Following the reasoning in Williams, once a state has determined through
its judiciary what it requires in retribution for a specific offense, then it
would seem that imprisonment of an indigent defendant for any longer
period for his innocent failure to pay a fine would be just as invidious a
discrimination as if he were imprisoned beyond the maximum statutory
term.3 When the state determines what would satisfy its penalogical in-
31 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 261 (1970) (Harlan, J.. concurring); 84 H-v.
L. REv. 46 (1970). See generally Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (Brennan,
Douglas, Marshal & White, JJ., concurring); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999,
89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
32See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Nemeth v. Thomas, 35 U.S.L.W.
2320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1966); Note, Imprisonment of an Indigent for the Non-
payment of a Fine Violates the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishments and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 4
HousroN L. REv. 695 (1967).
33 Justice Harlan felt, in his dissent in Williams, that the due process requirement
would likewise prevent the imprisonment of defaulting indigents whether the original,
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terests for an offense, whether through its judiciary or its legislature, any
further imprisonment of an indigent defendant due to his financial condi-
tion should be a violation of the equal protection provision of the fourteenth
amendment.3 4 Even though Williams and Tate were limited to the factual
situations involved therein, it seems inevitable that the Court will logically
extend this doctrine when an appropriate factual situation is presented to
it.35 The equal protection clause should protect any indigent defendant
from additional imprisonment beyond that to which he was originally
sentenced if such additional time is attributed merely to his inability to pay
a fine.36
A future extension of the Williams ruling may be indicated by a com-
panion case which was handed down on the same day. In Morris v. Schoon-
field,37 Justices White, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined in a con-
curring opinion to a per curiam decision in which they stated that the
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a fine on an indigent defendant
with the subsequent automatic conversion of the fine to a jail sentence
solely because of the defendant's inability to pay the fine." The concurring
term imposed upon them was equal to or less than the maximum permissable period.
He stated that "[iln this regard, unlike the Court, I see no distinction between the
circumstances where the State through its judicial agent determines that effective
punishment requires less than the maximum prison term plus a fine, or a fine alone,
and the circumstances of this case." Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 265 n.
-34 Whether an indigent defendant is sentenced to pay a fine alone, or to pay a fine
plus serve a term in jail, or to pay a fine or serve a term in jail, his incarceration for
his inability to pay such fine is a discriminatory practice. Upon default in the first
two situations, the legislature determines what additional incarceration will serve the
state's penalogical interests. In the third situation, the court makes that determination.
However, in each case, the defendant is given no choice. If a fine will be sufficient
retribution for the offender's misconduct, whether in conjunction with a jail term
or not, then such fine should not automatically be converted into a jail sentence.
See Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
Legislative action should impose limitations on the common practice of im-
posing sentences which offer the offender a choice of paying the fine or serving
a stated period of imprisonment, such as "$10 or 10 days." This type of sentence
is inherently discriminatory because it determines the severity of punishment
solely on the basis of a defendant's wealth. Statutes which authorize the imposi-
tion of fines should provide that if the court concludes that the public would
be adequately protected by the payment of the fine, the fine itself is the
appropriate sentence. TASK FoRcE REPORT at 18.
- See generally Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (concurring opinion);
Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (concurring opinion).
36See In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970); TAsK
FORcE REPORT 18.
3T 399 U.S. 508 (1970).
38The inequitable results which often follow such practices can be illustrated by
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Justices indicated that any such summary treatment of indigent offenders
will be strictly viewed by the Court. The Williams decision, they felt, at
least "means that in imposing fines as punishment for criminal conduct
more care must be taken to provide for those whose lack of funds would
otherwise convert a fine into a jail sentence." 39
Neither Williams nor Tate should be interpreted as prohibiting the im-
prisonment of any defendant, indigent or otherwise, for his contumacious
refusal to pay a fine.4 ° Such action is still considered by the Supreme Court
to be a legitimate method of enforcing fines. However, despite the legitimate
aims of default statutes, the results become unreasonable and discriminatory
when applied to indigent defendants. Even though there is a presumption
of constitutionality of state statutes, when their application results in dis-
crimination against a certain class of persons and affects a fundamental
constitutional guarantee, the presumption of constitutionality will not pre-
vail.4' The states have an interest in the punishment and rehabilitation
of offenders and in the collection of fines, but the automatic imprisonment
of indigent defendants is not constitutionally permissible since there are
alternate and equally effective remedies available to the states."' Since such
a basic freedom is at stake, the 'Court suggests that the states pursue such
alternative remedies rather than resort to automatic incarceration.
There are several alternatives to imprisonment for default which have
been used or proposed in various states and foreign countries:
(1) Abolition of all fines as a criminal sanction. This solution may elimi-
nate the evil of discriminatory imprisonment of indigent offenders for their
failure to pay a fine, but it would be unsatisfactory for other practical
the situation in Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), as
related by the court at 318:
The maximum penalty for jaywalking is a fine of $300 or imprisonment of ten
days, or both. Appellant received a fine of $150, one half of the allowable
maximum. In default of that fine, however, he was sentenced to imprisonment
for 60 days, 50 days in excess of the maximum which could have been imposed
upon him as an original sentence. In practical effect then, because he is an
indigent and known to be so, appellant has been sentenced to a straight term of
60 days. We hold this sentence invalid, and are of the opinion that in every
case in which the defendant is indigent, a sentence of imprisonment in default
of payment of a fine which exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which
could be imposed under the substantive statute as an original sentence is an
invalid exercise of the court's discretion for the reason that its only conceivable
purpose is to impose a longer term of punishment than is permitted by law.
S9 Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970) (concurring opinion).
40 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 n.19 (1970).
41 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).42 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
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reasons. 3 First, fines are an important source of revenue for the states and
localities; their loss would have adverse financial results. Secondly, many
crimes are not severe enough to warrant imprisonment, but are serious
enough to warrant some form of punishment." Fines are well suited as an
appropriate sanction for such minor offenses. Thirdly, if a day of imprison-
ment may be considered equal to a monetary sum, calculated by the loss
of a day's wages by the defendant, such imprisonment would operate as a
harsher penalty on wealthy employed offenders than on indigent unem-
ployed defendants. 5 Therefore, the imprisonment of all offenders would
operate as a form of inverse discrimination which would defeat the purpose
for which the fines were abolished. 6
(2) Individualized fines. To carry the equal protection argument to its
most logical extreme, trial judges would have to impose individualized fines
tailored to each defendant's financial position. The court would be forced
to measure the marginal utility of each dollar fined the defendant to insure
that the fine would be equally severe on a wealthy defendant as on a poor
one. The obvious difficulty with a system such as this is the complexity and
impracticality of its administration. This would be a constitutionally attrac-
tive system but would seem almost impossible to implement.
(3) Day fines. This plan is somewhat similar to the use of individualized
fines. In effect, it would involve the imposition of fines on the basis of a
certain number of days' wages for each offense." This approach would tend
to treat persons in different financial situations more equally. Day fines
have been used extensively in some European countries but have not been
43 See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HARV. L. REv. 435 (1967).44 This consideration applies mainly to the imposition of only a fine, rather than a
fine plus a term of imprisonment.
45 See Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for
Nonpayment of Fines, 64 MicH. L. Rxv. 938 (1966).
46 It is obvious that the imprisonment of all defendants would remove the choice
of sanctions which the non-indigent defendant now has when sentenced to pay a fine.
The result would be to force non-indigents to accept a harsher punishment than they
would receive upon the imposition of a fine, just as the present fine-or-imprisonment
system forces indigents to accept the harsher punishment.
47This was one of the main criticisms raised by Justice Harlan concerning the
majority's equal protection analysis in the Willians case. See 399 U.S. 235, 261. It is
doubtful, however, that any court would extend the equal protection guarantee to
such an extreme. Equal protection of the laws does not guarantee absolute equality.
but merely a freedom from "invidious discrimination." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 357 (1963). Undoubtedly "compelling state interests" would preclude the adoption
of a complicated system of individualized fines.
48See Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013 (1953).
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adopted in the United States. 9 The same administrative problems would
.ekist with day fines as with individualized fines.
(4) Weekend jail sentences. Many lower court judges voluntarily adopt
a system by which the defendant is allowed to serve out his jail sentence
by spending only weekends in jail, thereby permitting him to keep his job
and support his family. Weekend jail sentences are usually imposed in cases
where the offense is not serious and the loss of the defendant's job would
cause his family to become a burden on the state. Weekend jail terms solve
some of the practical problems related to imprisonment of indigent defen-
dants, but the constitutional issues involved still remain unsolved."
(5) Installment payments. The most popular, and probably the most
practical, method of enforcing the payment of fines without imprisonment
is the use of installment payments."' If an offender is unable to pay his fine
in a lump sum, the installment method allows him to attempt to pay the
fine in periodic installments which he can afford.2 Installment payments
provide the indigent offender with an actual choice as to the payment of
the fine; 3 he would no longer be faced with imminent imprisonment. Upon
49 d.
G0Even if indigent or low income defendants are allowed to serve their jail terms
on weekends, their treatment may still involve invidious discrimination if the term
which they must serve has been imposed because of the defendant's inability to pay
a fine. The fact that he may be allowed to keep his job does not alter the fact that
the indigent offender was forced to accept a jail term in lieu of a fine. But see
VA. CODE ANrN. § 19.1-300 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
51A deferred payment plan for the collection of fines from indigents has received
support both from the bench and the bar. See Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S.
March 2, 1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315
F. Supp. 548 (D. Md. 1970); Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969),
vacated per curiam, 399 U.S. 508 (1970); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999,
89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970); TAsK FORC REPORT 18.2 In most states which use the installment system the size of the payments is
generally set by the court pursuant to a report on the financial condition of the
defendant and the status of his employment. See, e.g., MD. Am. CODE art. 38, § 4
(Cum. Supp. 1970); MAss. AN. LAws ch. 279, § 1A (1968).
53Even though the installment method provides some low income offenders the
opportunity to pay their fines rather than go to jail, the problem still exists as to the
unemployed defendant. Such a person could not even pay a fine over a period of time.
In such situations, most statutes require the defendant to make a good faith attempt
to obtain employment. In case of his inability to find a job, the trial judge is usually
given the discretion to reduce the fine or revoke it altogether. However, allowing
a criminal offender to go unpunished is not an acceptable result either. In the situation
of such an unemployed offender, the best approach seems to be to allow him to work
for the state at a reasonable compensation until his fine has been paid. See generally
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisomnent of the Indigent for Nonpayment
of Fines, 64 MicH. L. REv. 938 (1966).
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default in the payment of the installments, the state could retain the remedy
of attaching any property the defendant may have,5" or the state could
reduce the amount of each installment by allowing a longer period of pay-
ment.5 Of course, if default were intentional or due to the negligence or
lack of good faith of the defendant, the alternative of imprisonment would
still be available.5"
Opponents of such a system for the collection of fines generally base their
arguments on what they feel would be the prohibitive costs of administra-
tion." However, when the direct and indirect costs to society of an impri-
sonment system are weighed against the relative costs of an installment
system, the former seems to be the more expensive.5" When an indigent
defendant is automatically imprisoned for default on his fine, the state then
has the burden of caring for and feeding the prisoner while he is in custody.
Moreover, assuming the defendant is willing and able to work, his imprison-
ment precludes any possibility of employment. As a direct result of his
unemployment, the defendant's family, possibly already living only slightly
above the subsistence level, will very likey become an additional burden on
the state. Finally, when the defendant is released from custody, his fine
will remain unpaid. The result of all this is that the state has expended a
relatively large amount of money in trying the defendant, imprisoning him
and possibly supporting his family, and in the end must write off the fine
as a loss.59
54 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1970). See also State v. Allen,
104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Some states allow the
defendant to be hired out to a private business in return for the payment of the fine
by the new "employer." See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-329 (1960).
55See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1A (1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.2
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
56id.
57 There is no doubt that the investigation into the financial situation of those
defendants claiming indigency and the man-hours needed to collect and supervise
the payment of each installment would involve greater expenditures of revenue than
a system whereby all fines are collected in a lump sum or not collected at all. See
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment
of Fines, 64 MIcH. L. Rxv. 938 (1966).
5sSee Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HARV. L. REv. 435 (1967).
59 From a purely economic standpoint, it would be difficult to defend the lump sum
payment-imprisonment system as a means to save money. It is obvious that such a
system cannot deal efficiently with indigent offenders. However, the possibility that
the alternative of a lump sum payment of fines or automatic imprisonment will have
a greater deterrent effect on future offenders must be considered. See Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Williams.
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On the other hand, the adoption of installment payments would seem
to save money in the long run. The institution of such a system would no
doubt involve relatively high costs of administration, but the savings on
subsequent expenses in other areas" should prove more than compensatory.
An indigent or low income offender who is allowed to pay his fine in install-
ments could retain any employment which he may have had and thereby
remain a productive member of society. He could continue supporting his
family while making reasonable weekly or monthly payments towards his
fine.6 Thus, neither he nor his family would become a burden on society
and the chances would be much greater that the fine would eventually be
paid.
Another and possibly more important by-product of an installment system
is that poor defendants would be able to retain a greater measure of per-
sonal dignity. Being able to retain his job, support his family, and still pay
his debt to society would have a much more favorable effect on the defen-
dant than the shame and ignominy of an automatic jail sentence. Since
most persons' only contact with the law is on the lower misdemeanor or
petty offense level, a fair system of installment payments would instill a
greater respect for the law. Enforcement of all unpaid fines by means of
imprisonment causes the lower class segments of society to view our legal
system as a harsh and discriminatory tool of oppression, whereas an install-
ment plan would go much further as a means of rehabilitation.
Another consideration when weighing the administrative convenience
of jail with the difficulties of a more complex installment system is the
importance of the defendant's interests which lie in the balance. 2 When a
fundamental right such as the liberty of a defendant is weighed against
the administrative convenience of a jail term, the individual's rights must
60 In many jurisdictions which have initiated a system of installment payments, the
number of offenders imprisoned for failure to pay fines has been drastically reduced.
See Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013 (1953). This result
would indicate that when given the chance to pay their fines at a rate commensurate
with their means, most defendants are willing and able to pay their fines rather than
work them off in jail.
GThe ease with which the defendant would be able to pay his fine by way of
installments again raises the question of whether this method would critically reduce
the deterrent effect of fines. It may be argued that an offender will no more fear
conviction for a minor offense than he would fear the purchase of a television set,
since he could pay for both on time. However, it seems that to an indigent defendant,
the thought of periodic garnishments from his pay check would be equally as dis-
tasteful as the lump sum payment would seem to a more wealthy defendant.
02 See Williams v. Illinois, 300 U.S. 235 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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prevail, especially when there is a reasonable alternative open to the states
such as an installment plan.
63
The practice of arbitrarily imprisoning a defendant for failing to pay
his fine may be attacked on due process grounds as well as on the basis
of equal protection.64 Mr. Justice Harlan chose the due process approach
in his concurring opinion in the Williams case.65 He felt that the equal pro-
tection analysis of the majority could logically be extended much further
than would be constitutionally necessary, pointing out that it was not the
purpose of the Constitution to cure every inequity in our society.66 The due
process clause, however, was much more restrictive in that it prevented
the arbitrary denial of a defendant's fundamental rights and was not based
on vague distinctions which would allow the court merely to substitute its
own concepts of fairness for basic constitutional guarantees.6 7 Justice Harlan
felt that the Illinois default statute would only be permissible under the
requirements of due process if the state legislature had made a "reasoned
judgment" that the state's penalogical interests could only be satisfied by
63 As stated by Justice Harlan, previous decisions of the Supreme Court in the area
of statutory classifications "unquestionably show that this Court will squint hard at any
legislation that deprives an individual of his liberty-his right to remain free ....
While the interest of the State, that of punishing one convicted of crime is no less
substantial, . . . the 'balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for
the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society . . . having regard to what history teaches' is such that the State's
interest here does not outweigh that of the individual ... I." !d. at 263 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
64 See State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (1969) (dissenting opinion);
Petition of Cole, 17 Ohio App. 2d 207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968).
65 Jusice Harlan attempted to distinguish his due process approach from the majority's
traditional equal protection analysis of statutory classification cases by alluding to his
dissenting opinions in previous cases. See cases cited note 27 supra.
6 Justice Harlan believes that the equal protection approach to discrimination cases
results in an attempt to require equal treatment of all persons similarly situated. This,
he feels, is not constitutionally necessary. The better analysis of unequal treatment of
persons by the State is to determine whether there is a rational relation between the
legislative distinction and the governmental purpose. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
260.
67 An analysis under due process standards, correctly understood, is, in my view,
more conducive to judicial restraint than an approach couched in slogans and
ringing phrases, such as "suspect" classification or "invidious" distinctions, or
"compelling" state interest, that blur analysis by shifting the focus away from
the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected,
the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, the
existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of
confidence we may have that the statute reflects the legislative concern for the
purpose that would legitimately support the means chosen.
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a lump sum payment of a fine. Since the legislature had never considered
whether a fine paid by installments would have the same rehabilitative and
deterrent effects as a lump sum payment, then the use of the lump sum-
imprisonment alternatives was an arbitrary denial of a basic liberty in viola-
tion of the due process clause.
Justice Harlan reserved judgment on the situation in which the state
legislature has made a reasoned judgment that only a lump sum payment-
rather than payment over a term-would satisfy the state's retributive,
rehabilitative and deterrent interests. There is some doubt as to the validity
of imprisonment-default statutes in reference to indigents even if the legis-
lature considered and rejected the effectiveness of installment payments.
Justice Harlan believed that it would be very difficult to justify a decision
that a fine paid in installments would be penalogically less effective than
one paid in a lump sum.6"
At least nine states now provide for the installment payment of fines,"o
and such a system has long been endorsed by the American Law Institute"&
and the American Bar Association." In Virginia, there is no statutory pro-
vision for installment fines,72 as such. Any defendant drawing a fine which
is levied or affirmed in a circuit or corporation court may be jailed until the
fine and/or costs are paid." The same may be done in a court not of record
68 Id.
( 9 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1970);
MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1A (1956); MicH. Comvp. LAws ANN.- § 769.3 (1968);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-593 (1962); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 10.82.030 (Cum. Supp. 1969); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 57.04 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
70 See MODEL PENAL CODE H9 302.1 & 302.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). These
sections allow the trial judge to impose a fine payable in a lump sum or by installments,
at his discretion. In case of default, the court may conduct a hearing to determine
whether nonpayment was willful. If so, the defendant may be imprisoned at a rate
of one day in jail per $5 of fine, or for 30 days in case of misdemeanor, or 1 year for a
felony, whichever term would be shorter. If nonpayment was involuntary, the court
may allow the defendant more time to pay, reduce the installments, or revoke the fine
altogether.
71 See AmErucAN BAR Ass'N PRojECT ON MINIMUM STAN ms FOR CRImINAL JusTrcE,
STANDARDS FOR SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEuREs § 2.7 (b), at 117 (Approved
Draft 1968).
72 But see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-300 (Cum. Supp. 1970). Virginia does have a work
release program which allows trial judges to permit certain low-income, employed
defendants to retain their jobs while being held in custody during their off-hours. Their
wages are subject to a form of garnishment for the payment of work release expenses,
support of defendant's family, or any fines or costs imposed on defendant. This
provision provides limited relief for low-income defendants convicted of minor offenses.
73 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-339 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
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if no security is given by the defendant."' If a defendant is jailed for a
specific term together with the court's direction that he remain there until
his fine and/or costs"5 are paid, he may be kept in custody until he pays
the fine or until the statutory limitation for such confinement expires. 7
The rate of credit at which the defendant may work off the fine depends
on the nature of his sentence. If he is jailed until his fine and costs are
paid, his rate of credit may be as little as $1 per day, with a limit of two
months per offense. 7 In this situation the fine and costs are not considered
satisfied by the jail term, and additional collective measures may subse-
quently be taken."
If the defendant instead is sentenced to work off his fine at the state farm
or with a field unit, he will be credited with $0.75 for each day that he
works, and $0.25 for each that he does not work. The maximum term in
this situation is six months,79 after which time the fine will be considered
paid in full."°
Virginia's default statutes appear to be much less comprehensive"1 than
the more progressive statutes of several other states.82 Virginia does have
one statutory provision which allows the trial judge, upon petition by the
defendant, to reduce or revoke the fine and imprisonment at the court's
discretion.83 However, this statute makes no mention that its purpose is to
relieve indigent defendants," nor does it set out any guidelines by which
7 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-338 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
75 This provision has remained intact despite the holding by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals that imprisonment for nonpayment of costs was a violation of the
involuntary servitude provision of the thirteenth amendment. See Wright v. Matthews,
209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
7 6 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-328 (1960).
7 7 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-334 (1960) provides that a defendant who is jailed until his
fine is paid may be held up to five days if the fine and costs are less than $5; up to ten
days if less than $10; up to fifteen days if less than $25; up to thirty days if less than
$50; and in no case more than two months. This section does not apply to the defendant
sentenced to work off his fine with a state labor unit. See May v. Dillard, 134 Va. 707,
114 S.E. 593 (1922).
78 May v. Dillard, 134 Va. 707, 114 S.E. 593 (1922); Quillin v. Commonwealth,
105 Va. 874, 54 S.E. 333 (1906).
79 The two-month and six-month maximum terms apply to each offense of which
the defendant is convicted.80 VA. CoDE ANrw. § 55-221 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
81 See statutes cited note 68 supra.
82 Compare statutes cited in Appendix of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 246
(1970).
8 3 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-332 (1960).84 The only Virginia case concerning § 19.1-332 has held that a defendant may be
[Vol. 5 :373
1COMMENTS
the judge may determine which defendants should be excused and under
what circumstances.
The only statutory provision in Virginia for the relief of convicted in-
digent offenders is the seldom-used work release program. 5 Under this
system, a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor or of nonsupport and
desertion may be allowed to retain his job while spending his nonworking
hours in custody. Whether a defendant will qualify for this program is in
the discretion of the trial judge. The only suggested guideline is whether
the loss of the defendant's salary during imprisonment would cause his
family to become charges of the state. If the trial judge decides a defendant
does qualify, he may provide in the offender's sentence for his release during
working hours and for the withdrawal from his wages of expenses for the
defendant's keep, travel, support for his dependents, or for any fines or costs.
This provision permits equitable treatment of some indigent defendants,
but it seems to fall short of providing adequate overall relief in the area of
imprisonment of indigents for failure to pay a fine. The trial judge is not
compelled to conduct any sort of investigation into a defendant's indigency,
nor is he compelled to make use of the work release program if the defen-
dant's indigent condition is brought to his attention. In addition, there are
no definite standards set to determine which defendants should qualify.
The statute seems to be directed toward those defendants who have a job
and support dependents. Thus, those offenders who are unemployed or
support no one possibly may not qualify for work release privileges. There
still remains the likely probability that many indigent offenders sentenced
to a fine will be automatically jailed for their inability to pay.
These provisions compare somewhat unfavorably with those of several
other states which provide for prompt hearings as to the defendant's finan-
cial condition and specify situations in which the court may allow a fine
to be paid by installments, or revoked altogether. The 1970 Maryland
legislature, for example, adopted elaborate provisions whereby an indigent
defendant could obtain a hearing in order to have the payment of his fine
altered to meet his financial situation." Under the new Maryland Act,
extensive use is made of the state's probation officers in the collection of
installment payments. Trial judges, when imposing fines, have the discre-
released if it is shown that further imprisonment would be injurious to his health.
See Wilkerson v. Allan, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 10 (1873). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3569
(1964).
85 VA. Coa ANw. § 19.1-300 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
86 MD. A w. CODE art. 38, § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
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tionary power to order payment in a lump sum or to permit payment by
installments to probation officers. If the defendant is sentenced to a term
of probation plus fine, the payment of his fine is a condition of his proba-
tion. If the defendant defaults in his payments or asserts his inability to pay
the fine, the court investigates his claim of indigency and his family situation
to verify the cause. According to the results of this investigation, the court
may reduce the fine if default is involuntary or order the defendant's impri-
sonment in the case of intentional or negligent default. In the case of impri-
sonment, the defendant must be credited with at least $10 of his fine for each
day of imprisonment.8"
Several other states"8 have adopted statutes similar to the Maryland Act.
Such procedures substantially eliminate the discriminatory aspects of en-
forcement of the payment of fines. The steps which are necessary to reduce
such discrimination have been proven successful "9 and are neither prohibi-
tively expensive nor difficult to administer.
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions9" and progressive state legisla-
tion,9 ' Virginia's statutes on the collection of fines do not seem sufficiently
comprehensive to adequately guarantee equal protection of the laws to
indigent defendants. It seems inevitable that the equal protection and due
process reasoning of the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois will even-
tually be extended to declare unconstitutional the imprisonment of indigent
defendants beyond their original terms for their inability to pay a fine.92
There are too many practical methods of collection and enforcement for
imprisonment to remain an acceptable alternative.9"
The lower court judges in Virginia, subsequent to Williams and Tate,
are now forced to resort to some alternative method for the collection of
fines from indigents before they may imprison such defendants for default
87 If the defendant is imprisoned for his default, the Maryland statute provides that
his imprisonment may not exceed one third of the maximum statutory term for the
substantive offense or 90 days, whichever is less. If the defendant had been fined for
a crime which carried no jail term, his incarceration for default may not exceed 15
days. If the defendant had been sentenced to a jail term plus a fine, his jail term for
default may in no case exceed the maximum term for that offense. Id.
8sSee, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1A (1956).
89See Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013 (1953).
90See Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970); Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970). See also Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
91 See statutes cited note 68 supra.
92 One state court has already chosen to extend Williams. See In re Antazo, 3 Cal.
3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
93 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 n.21 (1970).
COMMENTS
beyond the permissible statutory term.9 The only statutory means available
to Virginia trial judges to avoid such imprisonment is the work release
program.9" As previously discussed, this provision does not adequately estab-
lish a satisfactory alternative means for the collection of fines from indigent
offenders. Due to the Williams and Tate rulings, it will no longer be per-
missible for lower court judges to provide work release advantages for some
indigent defendants, but they must provide an alternative means for pay-
ment to all indigents who come within the purview of Williams and Tate.
Therefore, additional legislation in this area is needed in order to provide
Virginia's judges with a more workable means to collect fines from indigent
offenders. Hopefully, a more extensive provision may be adopted providing
for installment payment of fines as well as a reliable method for determining
the ability of defendants to pay their fines.
P.DEB.R.
04 Three days subsequent to the Tate decision, an opinion rendered by Andrew P.
Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, was sent to all judges in the state. The Attorney
General stated that Tate was applicable to all prisoners presently serving a sentence
solely for failure to pay fines or who are or will be incarcerated as a result of an
unpaid fine after serving a definite term. A determination of which prisoners should
be released, however, was left to the discretion of the judges who had imposed the
sentences.
Although it was not mentioned in this opinion, the standard for ascertaining which
prisoners should be released is that recited in the Williams and Tate decisions. These
decisions affect all those defendants whose confinement, because of their inability to
pay a fine, extends beyond the maximum statutory term for the substantive offense
for which they were convicted.
95 VA. CODE Arw. § 19.1-300 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
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